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Abstract 
We examine the negotiations held under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change 
in Paris, December 2015. Prior to these negotiations, there was considerable uncertainty about whether an agreement 
would be reached, particularly given that the world’s leaders failed to do so in the 2009 negotiations held in 
Copenhagen. Amid this uncertainty, we applied three different methods to predict the outcomes: an expert survey and 
two negotiation simulation models, namely the Exchange Model and the Predictioneer’s Game. After the event, these 
predictions were assessed against the coded texts that were agreed in Paris. The evidence suggests that combining 
experts’ predictions to reach a collective expert prediction makes for significantly more accurate predictions than 
individual experts’ predictions. The differences in the performance between the two different negotiation simulation 
models were not statistically significant. 
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1. Negotiating and Predicting the Paris Climate 
Agreement 
In the first half of 2015, the global climate negotiations 
arrived at a crossroads. Would the high expectations for 
an international agreement by the end of 2015 at Paris 
be met? And if an agreement were reached, what would 
be the contents of such a global climate treaty? There 
was a great deal of uncertainty regarding the answers to 
these questions before the Paris negotiations were con-
cluded. Amid this uncertainty, we generated forecasts of 
the negotiation outcomes based on three distinct ap-
proaches: an Ex Ante Expert Survey of expected results 
and two negotiation simulation models. Each of these 
approaches produced forecasts well in advance of the 
start of the final round of the Paris negotiations. In this 
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article we report on the relative accuracy of the predic-
tions generated by each of the three approaches. 
The global climate regime originates from scientific 
efforts to elevate the issue of climate change to the 
global, diplomatic level in the 1980s, which ultimately 
culminated in the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Luterbacher 
& Sprinz, 2001, in press). The UNFCCC enjoys universal 
support, perhaps because it is mostly declaratory. By 
contrast, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC has 
been marked by more controversy. The Kyoto Protocol 
mandated all industrialized countries to manage their 
absolute emissions and to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions by about 5% between 1990 and 2012. 
Developing countries were not obliged to undertake mit-
igation obligations. The USA signed, but never ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol due to fears regarding the impacts on 
its domestic economy and the lack of emission-reducing 
obligations for emerging economies (Bang, Hovi, & 
Sprinz, 2012; Hovi, Sprinz, & Bang, 2012). Canada left 
the Kyoto Protocol just before the end of the first com-
pliance period of 2008-2012. While a second compli-
ance period of the Kyoto Protocol was ultimately 
agreed in 2012, it obliges only European countries and 
Australia to reduce emissions until 2020. The limita-
tions of the Kyoto Protocol meant that the urgency of 
formulating a new global climate agreement grew. 
A first attempt to agree on a successor to the Kyoto 
Protocol with universal participation was scheduled for 
December 2009 in Copenhagen (Dimitrov, 2010). Those 
hoping for a global agreement were bitterly disap-
pointed. Before the Copenhagen conference took 
place, Stokman (2009, 2015) conducted an analysis of 
the negotiations similar to the one we perform here. 
He applied the Exchange Model, which correctly pre-
dicted that two issues would block a comprehensive 
agreement in Copenhagen, namely whether or not the 
proposed treaty would be an extension of the Kyoto 
Protocol and whether or not developing countries 
would be obliged to reduce CO2 in a measurable, relia-
ble, and verifiable way. A similarly pessimistic predic-
tion was made by Bueno de Mesquita (2009). Regret-
tably these pessimistic predictions were borne out by 
the 2009 Conference of the Parties at Copenhagen. 
The period prior to the Paris conference in December 
2015 was characterized by considerable uncertainty 
about whether more progress would be made this time. 
There were some signs to warrant optimism. Notwith-
standing the failure to reach an agreement in Copenha-
gen, those talks did lead to a new bottom-up approach, 
which arguably laid the foundations for a future agree-
ment. Since Copenhagen, countries have been strongly 
encouraged to develop Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs),1 which are essentially national 
                                                          
1 Future national commitments will be laid down in Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs). 
climate policy plans to be shared with the UNFCCC’s 
membership. Furthermore, the failure at Copenhagen 
led to an impetus to avoid a repeat. The United States’ 
government also took a markedly different approach in 
the preparations for the Paris Conference of the Parties 
(COP) compared to the Copenhagen COP, displaying a 
greater commitment to making multilateral negotiations 
work. This stronger commitment to reaching an agree-
ment at Paris was shared with the Chinese government, 
and embodied in a joint US-China presidential statement 
in September 2015, in which Presidents Obama and Xi 
emphasized their personal commitment to finding an 
agreement.2 Despite these positive signs, large differ-
ences remained between the negotiating positions of 
the world’s largest countries and regions. 
It was in this uncertain context that we began a 
study in early 2015 with a view to predicting the out-
comes of the Paris negotiations. We employed three dis-
tinct methods for generating these predictions, one 
based on experts’ predictions, and two based on negoti-
ation simulation models, all of which will be described in 
more detail below. Our research team consists of re-
searchers from two international climate institutes (CIC-
ERO—Center for International Climate and Environmen-
tal Research—Oslo, and PIK—Potsdam Institute for 
Climate Impact Research) and three universities (New 
York University, University of Groningen, and University 
of Strathclyde). To ensure the comparability of the pre-
dictions from these three different approaches, it was 
important to identify and assess a common set of issues, 
and to design the study in such a way that the analyses 
could be performed using a common set of inputs into 
the simulation models. We published our predictions in 
October and November 2015 on an academic, open ac-
cess internet platform—well before the final round of 
global climate negotiations—which were concluded by 
12 December 2015 (Kallbekken & Sælen, 2015; Sprinz & 
Bueno de Mesquita, 2015; Stokman & Thomson, 2015). 
Here, we revisit the methods for predicting the Paris 
outcomes, which is a combination of a decision of the 
Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC and the an-
nexed legally binding Paris international agreement.3 
Arild Underdal’s contribution to the study of inter-
national climate policy is profound and our work has 
been clearly influenced by his contributions. In effect, 
Underdal was “present at the creation” of this article 
on at least two occasions. First, in the early 2000s, Har-
old K. Jacobson suggested using simulation models to 
forecast global climate negotiations, and Underdal, 
Bueno de Mesquita, and Sprinz were part of the team 
that further developed the idea; yet progress at the 
                                                          
2 US-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/us-
china-joint-presidential-statement-climate-change 
3 See FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (http://unfccc.int/resource/do 
cs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf). 
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time was stalled by the untimely passing away of Ja-
cobson. Second, Underdal served as chief applicant of 
the Centre for International Climate and Energy Policy 
(CICEP), and Sprinz approached him in late 2014 with 
the idea to follow up on the earlier ambition. As a re-
sult, Arild Underdal and other CICEP members4 con-
tributed to the derivation of the scales employed in 
this article. This approach to employing multiple meth-
ods to predict the outcomes of multilateral negotia-
tions represents a novel approach to research on glob-
al climate change negotiations, which with some 
notable recent exceptions (e.g., Genovese, 2014; 
Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2012; Weiler, 2012), has 
been characterized by qualitative case studies. 
In the following, we provide brief overviews of the 
approaches used (Section 2) and the assessment of the 
results (Section 3), while the final section offers con-
cluding observations.  
2. Three Approaches 
In this section, we outline the procedure for identifying 
the substantive issues to be predicted and the three 
methodological avenues chosen to make predictions 
on these issues. In addition, we describe the procedure 
for obtaining the input information for the negotiation 
simulation models, which consists of the list of main 
stakeholders and several key attributes of each of 
these stakeholders.  
2.1. The Issues at Stake and Scaling 
We identified 13 key negotiation issues that together 
address the main components of the global climate 
change regime. The negotiation issues fall under the 
headings of the mitigation of greenhouse gases (reduc-
ing emissions), adaptation (coping with damages due 
to climate change), and compensation. In addition, the 
issues address the overarching question of differentia-
tion of obligations, and issues concerning climate fi-
nance as well as legal form. For each issue, a range of 
possible outcomes was identified and placed on a scale 
from 0–100. This was undertaken based on interviews 
with UNFCCC negotiators, the initial draft negotiation 
text for the Paris Agreement as of 25 February 2015,5 
parties’ submissions to the negotiations process, con-
sultation with scholars, and the authors’ knowledge of 
the process. The 13 issues were labelled as follows: 
 differentiation (of obligations) 
 mitigation—monitoring, review, and verification 
(MRV) as well as compliance arrangements 
                                                          
4 We greatly appreciate the guidance offered by Guri Bang and 
Jon Hovi. 
5 See FCCC/ADP/2015/1 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/20 
15/adp2/eng/01.pdf) 
 the legal form of obligations on mitigation 
 the legal form of adaptation 
 institutional setup for adaptation 
 climate finance—volume 
 climate finance—who is obliged to contribute? 
 adaptation reserved finance 
 loss & damage 
 the mechanism to determine future mitigation 
obligations (progression principle) 
 mitigation goal for 2050 
 mitigation goal for 2100 and 
 ex ante assessment of future Nationally Deter-
mined Contributions. 
The scaling of possible outcomes on each issue im-
plies that alternatives are ranked on a single dimension 
(e.g., from least to most ambitious). The numerical dif-
ference between alternative outcomes is assumed to 
be interval scale and related to the political difference 
between them. All issues and respective scales can be 
found in Appendix 1. 
In the first of the three approaches to generating 
predictions, we conducted an Ex Ante Expert Survey 
(see below), in which we asked experts to make 
straightforward predictions of the outcome on each of 
these 13 scales. The simulation models, however, re-
quire more information. They generate predictions of 
outcomes using information on the main stakeholders 
and some of their key attributes, including stakehold-
ers’ positions on each of the issues. Our first task was 
to identify the relevant stakeholders. While we recog-
nize the importance of NGOs in the global governance 
of climate change, the consensus among the experts 
and participants we consulted is that the COPs are pri-
marily intergovernmental affairs. We therefore decided 
to focus on major countries and groups of countries as 
stakeholders. A range of negotiating groups are formal-
ly recognized by the UNFCCC secretariat.6 We followed 
these groupings, while recognizing the political reality 
that major countries have to be included separately 
from their groups. The resulting 16 stakeholders were 
chosen to include the most prominent individual coun-
tries and negotiating blocks within the UNFCCC. To the 
list of major emitters, we added country groups based 
around regional affiliation or shared interests so that 
virtually every Party to the UNFCCC is represented and 
overlap avoided. We do not include the G77 as a sepa-
rate actor, for instance, because its members are rep-
resented by other stakeholders, and the G77 does not 
take a coherent position on all issues. Our stakeholders 
consist of the following: 
 African Group 
                                                          
6 See http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/negotiat 
ing_groups/items/2714.php 
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 AILAC—Association of Independent Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean States 
 ALBA—Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our 
America 
 AOSIS—Alliance of Small Island States 
 the Arab Countries 
 Bangladesh/LDCs—Least Developed Countries 
 Brazil 
 China 
 EIG—Environmental Integrity Group 
 the EU28 
 India 
 Indonesia7 
 Umbrella group ([Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand, Kazakhstan, Norway, the Russian Federa-
tion, Ukraine, and the USA] minus [Japan, Russia, 
USA]) 
 Japan 
 Russia and the 
 USA. 
The selection of these stakeholders implies the as-
sumption that all domestic and transnational actors in-
fluence the international negotiations by way of these 
16 stakeholders. By necessity, this simplifies the more 
complex reality, including the fact that each of these 
stakeholders includes several factions. This is a defend-
able simplification in that each stakeholder can only 
represent a single negotiating position on each issue. 
However, the lack of information on each faction’s po-
sition means that the information is less nuanced than 
recommended by the proponents of the negotiation 
simulation models. 
We gathered estimates of the negotiation positions 
of each of the stakeholders on each of the 13 issues, 
and in doing so placed each of the stakeholders on a 
position (between 0 and 100) on each of the issues. 
These position estimates were based on analysis of 
stakeholders’ submissions and statements to the nego-
tiations on the Paris Agreement since the launch of 
that process in 2011—in total 185 documents. This 
analysis was supplemented with interviews of key ne-
gotiators, and the authors’ experience from closely fol-
lowing the negotiations process. Not all stakeholders 
took a position on each of the issues. For instance, nei-
ther Brazil nor China had a clear position on the issues 
concerning mitigation goals for 2050 and 2100. In their 
working paper published prior to the Paris conference, 
Sprinz and Bueno de Mesquita (2015) applied the Pre-
dictioneer’s Game to the set of issues excluding the 
2050 and 2100 issues, arguing that the data on these 
                                                          
7 Due to varying data availability, Indonesia was excluded from 
the simulations of the Exchange Model whereas the simula-
tions of the Predictioneer’s Game allowed for inclusion of In-
donesia whenever data were available. 
issues are incomplete. For the purposes of comparison, 
we include these two issues but note their earlier con-
cern and the fact that the substantive findings are the 
same regardless of whether these issues are included. 
We derived estimates of the level of salience that 
each stakeholder attached to each issue and the flexi-
bility of each stakeholder on each issue. Again, these 
salience and flexibility estimates were quantified on 0–
100 scales. These judgements were derived from as-
sessments by the authors, which were informed by 
how often and strongly stakeholders had expressed 
positions in their submissions and statements, and on 
interviews with negotiators. Finally, the models also 
require estimates of the relative influence of each of 
the stakeholders. We formulated two sets of influence 
scores, which turned out to be highly correlated: one 
from a team of negotiators and one from a subgroup of 
the authors based on their own scholarly judgement. In 
the working papers published prior to the Paris confer-
ence, Stokman and Thomson (2015) applied the Ex-
change Model based on the influence scores from ne-
gotiators, while Sprinz and Bueno de Mesquita (2015) 
applied the Predictioneer’s Game based on the influ-
ence scores from the authors. Here, we compare the 
predictions using the authors’ set of influence scores, 
but note that the main findings remain the same re-
gardless of which set of influence scores we use. 
2.2. The Expert Survey 
The first approach to prediction was based on a survey 
of experts, which was held during 9–20 September 
2015, more than two months before the Paris confer-
ence began on 30 November 2015. We issued an 
online survey to a convenience sample of 104 experts 
whom the authors identified though several scholarly 
projects and events that closely followed the then cur-
rent negotiations. Although previous experiments (Tet-
lock, 2005; Tetlock & Gardner, 2015) have shown that 
experts perform no better—sometimes even worse—
than amateurs, we selected experts because our sur-
vey focused on detailed sub-topics in the negotiations, 
meaning that a substantial knowledge of the process 
was required to provide well-formed predictions. A to-
tal of 38 respondents (36.5%) provided predictions, 
and almost all respondents gave predictions on all of 
the issues. The survey questionnaire used the same is-
sue scales that were used for the input data for the ne-
gotiation simulation models (Appendix 1). Respondents 
were asked to give their expectations on outcomes of 
the Paris negotiations as positions on each of the 13 
scales, employing the ordinal scale points mentioned in 
Appendix 1. We emphasized that they should enter the 
outcome they expected even if it deviated from the 
positions they advocated. We assured the respondents 
that their responses would be anonymized. We refer to 
these experts as the “Ex Ante Experts.” 
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In addition to the 13 substantive questions, we also 
asked respondents about their regional affiliation and 
their role in the global climate negotiations. While we 
did not expect to obtain a representative sample, it is 
useful to know whether the responses might be biased 
in any particular direction. The invited experts were 
fairly well distributed across regions, but those who re-
sponded were primarily (82%) from the UNFCCC region 
“Western Europe and others (including the USA)”. Sim-
ple tests indicate that responses of the predicted out-
comes per issue do not differ between this dominant 
group and respondents from other regions. One third 
of respondents were researchers, and one quarter 
were country delegates (negotiators). The rest consist-
ed of consultants, NGO representatives, former coun-
try delegates, and journalists. 
The respondents were also given the opportunity to 
provide comments on each question and to the overall 
survey. Many of the comments expressed a desire for 
more nuanced response options. These responses are 
understandable given that the set of alternatives had 
to conform to a monotonically increasing scale to en-
sure comparability with the two simulations models, 
thereby imposing some limitations on the range of 
possible alternatives. The questionnaire informed re-
spondents about this limitation and asked them to pick 
the alternative corresponding most closely to their ex-
pectation in cases where none of the labeled scale 
points fitted perfectly. 
2.3. The Simulation Models 
Collective decision-making is the process in which 
stakeholders have to transform different preferences 
into a single collective decision that binds all actors 
within a social system. In doing so, all actors try to in-
fluence the decision outcome, including efforts by some 
to prevent decision-making and maintain the status quo. 
The dynamics in collective decision-making processes re-
sult from the simultaneous efforts of stakeholders with 
different policy positions to build coalitions in support of 
their own positions. This implies that stakeholders may 
be willing or forced to support positions that differ from 
those they advocated at the outset of the negotiations. 
In the literature, such shifts in positions are attributed to 
three main processes: persuasion, logrolling, and en-
forcement (Stokman, Van der Knoop, & Van Oosten, 
2013), and each of these processes is associated with a 
specific type of network (Stokman, 2014). Previous re-
search has applied models that are representative of 
these processes to international negotiations in the con-
text of EU decision-making (Thomson, Stokman, Achen, 
& Koenig, 2006). The present study extends this work to 
the global level by applying two such models: the Ex-
change Model, which represents the logrolling process; 
and the Predictioneer’s Game, which represents the 
enforcement process. 
2.3.1. Exchange Model 
The Exchange Model encapsulates the intuitively plau-
sible idea that negotiations are driven by a process of 
political exchange, whereby stakeholders make con-
cessions on some issues in return for concessions on 
other issues. The result is that stakeholders are willing 
to support another position on an issue that is of rela-
tively less importance to them in exchange for support 
from another stakeholder on an issue that is relatively 
more important to them. The model formalizes the 
conditions under which political exchanges take place 
and provides a tool for analyzing complex negotiations 
in which many stakeholders and issues are involved. 
The Exchange Model assumes that each stakehold-
er has complete knowledge of the positions, issue sali-
ences, and influence of all other stakeholders. We fur-
ther assume that all stakeholders share a common 
view on what the expected outcome on each issue will 
be if each issue were considered separately. This ex-
pected outcome is a variant of the Nash Bargaining So-
lution (NBS), which is approximated by the average of 
the initial policy positions of the stakeholders, 
weighted by the product of each stakeholder’s influ-
ence and salience (Achen, 2006). This expected out-
come can be considered a collectively optimal outcome 
for all actors if each issue is considered separately. Po-
sition exchanges link pairs of issues and provide pairs 
of stakeholders with opportunities to reach decision 
outcomes that they prefer to the expected outcome. 
Therefore, position exchanges allow the actors involved 
in those exchanges to optimize the expected decision 
outcomes in line with their own individual interests. 
Each stakeholder may have one or more possible 
exchange opportunities. If a stakeholder has more than 
one opportunity, it must select the one it tries to real-
ize. A potential exchange is realized only if both stake-
holders agree to realize it. This will happen only if nei-
ther of them has a better alternative exchange. When 
an exchange is realized, both stakeholders may make 
deals with other stakeholders only if the outcomes of 
such deals have no negative effects for the first ex-
change partner. This condition, of course, limits future 
exchange possibilities in the bargaining process. In oth-
er words, when stakeholders realize an opportunity for 
an exchange they enter into a binding commitment, 
which is what makes the Exchange Model a coopera-
tive bargaining model. Within each round of the simu-
lated negotiations, the model works through each ex-
change opportunity and calculates the resulting shifts 
in stakeholders’ positions. The round ends after all ex-
changes have been realized. At the end of a round, 
there usually remain differences among actors’ posi-
tions. The expected outcome based on actors’ revised 
positions is taken as the predicted outcome after that 
round of exchanges. The model assumes that the stake-
holders then commence a subsequent round of negotia-
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tions, starting with initial positions somewhere between 
their initial positions in the previous round and their ne-
gotiated positions at the end of the previous round. The 
higher the salience of an issue to an actor, the greater is 
the weight of the former initial position relative to the 
negotiated position. Extensive experience in applying 
the Exchange Model shows that ten rounds give a good 
estimate of final positions and outcomes in negotiations 
(Stokman & Van Oosten, 1994). 
Modeling position exchanges requires careful con-
sideration of the nature of these exchanges. In particu-
lar, a choice has to be made about which exchange rate 
to use. The exchange rate determines the extent to 
which each stakeholder shifts its position. The present 
Exchange Model uses an equal, absolute utility gain for 
both exchange partners. This has the advantage that 
exchanges have the same utility for both partners, and 
that the exchanges can be ordered in terms of their 
relative attractiveness to both exchange partners. The 
disadvantage of the equal utility gain assumption is 
that it involves an intersubjective comparison of utility, 
which is theoretically problematic (Arrow 1951/1963). 
581), however, review -Roth and Malouf (1979, pp. 580
rong tendency for several studies that report a st
outcomes of bargaining games to give players equal 
payoffs when those outcomes differ from the Nash 
prediction. More recent evidence results from splitting 
resource pool experiments (Dijkstra & Van Assen, 
olutions for the alternative s2008). Furthermore, 
exchange rate lead to different orderings of exchanges 
for each stakeholder, facing the problem of deadlock, 
whereby no two stakeholders prefer, and therefore can 
.realize, the same exchange  
Bilateral exchanges also have important side effects 
or externalities with respect to the utilities of other 
stakeholders as exchanges result in shifts in the ex-
pected outcomes on issues. Externalities arise when 
stakeholders who are not involved in an exchange are 
either positively or negatively affected by it (Dijkstra, 
Van Assen, & Stokman, 2008; Van Assen, Stokman, & 
Van Oosten, 2003). If over all simulated exchanges be-
tween stakeholders, the positive externalities for each 
stakeholder are greater than the negative ones, we may 
expect overall agreement. If, however, important stake-
holders experience substantively higher negative exter-
nalities of other stakeholders’ exchanges than positive 
ones, including their own exchanges, this may result in 
opposition to the negotiated outcomes. In such cases, 
the final interests of the stakeholders are likely to be in-
sufficiently complementary to reach overall agreement. 
2.3.2. The Predictioneer’s Game 
The Predictioneer’s Game is a model designed to ad-
dress policy problems for which there is the possibility 
of a negotiated compromise but there is also the pos-
sibility of threat or actual use of costly, coercive pres-
sure (Bueno de Mesquita, 2011). The model is not ap-
propriate, however, for market-driven decisions since 
these do not involve either negotiation or coercion. 
The Predictioneer’s Game assumes that people are ra-
tional in the sense that they do what they believe is in 
their best interest. They may learn later that the nego-
tiations lead to different results. The model is both 
predictive and prescriptive. For instance, one feature 
of the model as a practical tool is that its output can al-
so help decision makers better anticipate what would 
happen if they alter their pattern of action in specific 
ways designated through the model’s logic. Based on 
hundreds of applications in peer-reviewed outlets (and 
many more in confidential settings), the evidence 
shows that this model and its predecessors accurately 
predicts issue outcomes over ninety percent of the 
time (e.g., Ray & Russett, 1996). Hence, it is a reliable 
and practical tool for policy analysis. 
The Predictioneer’s Game solves N(N—1) two-player 
games for t-periods of play where N is the number of 
players, with third-party interests included in each play-
er’s calculations. The game assumes two dimensions of 
uncertainty for each player. Each player is uncertain re-
garding each other player’s type on two dimensions. 
Specifically, is another player the type that, given the 
opportunity, prefers to coerce or negotiate and, if co-
erced, prefers to retaliate or give in? Players update be-
liefs about each other’s types following Bayes Rule and is 
solved for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria for each stage 
game. The stage games are repeated t times, where t, 
the number of iterations, can be selected by the user. 
The model signals the period when the “super” game for 
all players is expected to end based on two conditions: 
(1) looking ahead one period, the average player expects 
her welfare to decline or, (2) if there are veto players, at 
least one of them believes it is better to stop the game 
than to continue to the next “round.” 
The sequence of play for player pair i,j when i 
moves first is as follows: 
(1) Player i decides whether to make a proposal 
whose content is endogenously derived. A pro-
posal requests a shift in j’s position on the issue 
in dispute; 
(2) If a proposal was made, then the recipient 
chooses to accept or make a strategically cho-
sen counter-proposal. If no proposal was made, 
then j has the opportunity to follow the se-
quence of moves initially available to i (follow-
ing the sequence described for i); 
(3) Following a proposal and counter-proposal, 
player i can offer a compromise settlement with 
j or i can coerce j, imposing costs; 
(4) If a compromise offer was made, then j can ne-
gotiate, producing an expected agreement, or j 
can coerce i; 
(5) Following any coercive move, the target can re-
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taliate or capitulate to the other player’s de-
manded outcome. 
The model relies on the mean voter theorem to 
generate estimated predicted outcomes in each round, 
using the average of the mean-voter prediction in the 
first round in which one of the game-ending conditions 
has been met plus the average of the mean predicted 
outcome in the round before (if there is one) and the 
round after. Unlike the Exchange Model, the Predictio-
neer’s Game is a non-cooperative bargaining model 
and relies on the assumption of issue-by-issue deci-
sions rather than concessions across issues. 
3. Overview of Results 
In the following, we report our results for the three 
approaches used to predict the outcomes of the cli-
mate negotiations and the accuracy of each of these 
approaches. The information on the point predictions 
derived from each of the three approaches to predict-
ing the outcomes of the Paris negotiations is provided 
in Table 1. From the first approach to prediction, which 
is based on the 38 Ex Ante Experts, we take the aver-
age of these 38 predictions as the collective prediction 
of our group of experts. We are also, however, inter-
ested in the predictive accuracy of individual experts 
compared to predictions from the other approaches. 
The information in Table 1 shows not only the average 
of the Ex Ante Experts’ predictions, but also the range 
and standard deviations of the experts’ predictions. This 
information clearly shows a great deal of variation 
among experts in their expectations about the outcomes 
of the negotiations. Note that it is entirely possible for 
individual experts’ predictions to be far from the actual 
outcome, while the average of their predictions is close 
to the actual outcome: For example, if two experts pre-
dict 0 and 100 on a policy scale while the actual outcome 
is 50. This is a possibility we examine below. 
Table 1. Ex Ante predictions and Ex Post assessments. 
 
 
Ex Ante Predictions  Ex Post Assessment 
Issue 
 
Average of Ex 
Ante Experts 
(range; s.d.) 
Inclusive 
Exchange 
Model 
Restrictive 
Exchange 
Model 
Predictioneer’s 
Game 
 Our Coding of COP-21 
Texts 
Differentiation 
 
39 
(0-75; 23.03) 
38 35 58  50 
Mitigation—MRV & 
Compliance 
 
43 
(0-75; 27.54) 
44 58 50  70 
Mitigation—Legal 
Form 
 
60 
(0-70; 19.42) 
45 51 53  70 
Adaptation—Legal 
Framework 
 
44 
(0-100; 18.76) 
79 79 60  50 
Adaptation—
Institutions 
 
52 
(0-60; 20.55) 
65 65 67  50 
Climate Finance—
Volume 
 
17 
(0-100; 17.10)  
60 41 55  20 
Climate Finance—
Who Pays? 
 
33 
(0-80; 20.49) 
39 21 27  20 
Adaptation Reserved 
Finance 
 
30 
(0-100; 27.54) 
53 68 66  40 
Loss & Damage 
 
29 
(0-70; 16.63) 
10 15 45  30 
Ambition Level—
Mitigation Mechanism 
 
42 
(0-100; 21.68) 
30 43 35  65 
Mitigation—2050 
 
29 
(0-100; 25.39)  
69 58 47  10 
Mitigation—2100 
 
33 
(0-100; 35.10) 
91 86 85  80 
Ex Ante Assessment of 
Future (I)NDCs 
 
42 
(0-100; 29.15) 
7 9 47  20 
Note: The Ex Ante Expert survey contains responses from 38 experts, each of whom predicted the outcomes on almost 
all of the 13 issues. 
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From the second approach to prediction, which is 
based on the Exchange Model, we derive two sets of 
predictions. These two sets of predictions differ with 
respect to the assumption about which issues are 
linked to each other in the process of negotiations, 
which in effect leads to two distinct variants of the Ex-
change Model. In the Inclusive Exchange Model, we as-
sume that exchanges are possible across all 13 issues. 
The Restrictive Exchange Model by contrast assumes 
that exchanges can only be made across issues within 
substantively related subsets of issues. From Table 1, 
these groups are: 
(1) mitigation and adaptation issues: Differentia-
tion, Mitigation-MRV & Compliance, Mitigation-
Legal Form, Adaptation-Legal Framework, Adap-
tation-Institutions, and Ambition Level-
Mitigation Mechanism 
(2) finance issues: Climate Finance-Volume, Climate 
Finance-Who Pays?, Adaptation-Reserved Fi-
nance, and Loss & Damage and 
(3) ambition issues: Mitigation 2050, and Mitigation 
2100. 
The reason for specifying these distinct variants of 
the Exchange Model was that both before and after 
the Paris negotiations we obtained evidence that the 
financial issues were negotiated relatively inde-
pendently from the rest of issues. For that reason, we 
published predictions from both the Inclusive and Re-
strictive Exchange Models before the Paris conference 
(Stokman & Thomson 2015; Tables 2 and 3). By con-
trast, in the third approach to prediction, based on the 
Predictioneer’s Game, issues are not linked with each 
other at all. We therefore present only one set of pre-
dictions from that approach. The various predictions 
shown in Table 1 should be interpreted in light of the 
issue-specific scales reported in Appendix 1. As noted 
earlier, the predictions we assess here differ marginally 
from those we published prior to the Paris conference 
because we revised the input data to ensure that the 
analyses are as comparable as possible.8 
                                                          
8 As noted earlier, the predictions of the Exchange Model pub-
lished prior to the conference were based on estimates of in-
fluence provided by negotiators, while the predictions of the 
Predictioneer’s Game were based on similar estimates from a 
subgroup of authors. Here we use the estimates from our au-
thors. The predictions from the Predictioneer’s Game excluded 
the issues of mitigation goals for 2050 and 2100 due to concerns 
about missing data, while those presented here include these is-
sues. The results are substantively the same if we exclude the 
two ambition issues. Using our own coding of the COP-21 texts 
as the benchmark, we obtain the following mean errors (and 
standard deviations) for the remaining 11 issues: Average Ex 
Ante Experts 11.64 (8.90); Individual Ex Ante Experts 21.45 
(14.65); Inclusive Exchange Model 22.45 (9.43); Restrictive Ex-
change Model 17.10 (7.99); Predictioneer’s Game 18.02 (7.45). 
Table 1 also contains our coding of the actual out-
comes of the Paris negotiations. Initially, we asked 12 
independent experts from around the world, across a 
broad range of disciplinary backgrounds, to individually 
score the outcomes of the Paris negotiations in an 
email survey. This ex post sample of experts did not 
overlap with the ex ante sample. Half of the invited ex-
perts scored the outcomes on the scales reprinted in 
Appendix 1. This Ex Post Expert Survey unexpectedly 
generated considerable variance across experts for a 
broad range of issues. Since the range of responses 
was very substantial, we ourselves undertook two 
complete codings of the outcomes of the issues. Our 
two codings produced nearly identical results, and we 
retained one of them as our ex post assessment of the 
negotiated outcomes (Table 1), substantiated, by direct 
reference—for each issue—to the core UNFCCC COP-
21 decision and the Paris Agreement (see Appendix 2). 
To assess the accuracy of our predictions across 
three approaches, Table 2 contains the mean absolute 
errors across the 13 issues as the benchmark for as-
sessing the accuracy of the predictions given in Table 1. 
To calculate the errors of the predictions of “Average 
Ex Ante Experts,” we first calculated the average pre-
diction made by the 38 Ex Ante Experts on each of the 
13 issues. We then calculated the absolute difference 
between this average (collective) prediction and the 
actual outcomes, and then calculated the average of 
these absolute differences across the 13 issues. By con-
trast, to calculate the error of the predictions of “Indi-
vidual Ex Ante Experts,” we first calculated the abso-
lute difference between each of the 38 Ex Ante 
Experts’ predictions and the actual outcomes. We then 
computed the average error across the 38 experts, be-
fore calculating the average error across the 13 issues. 
A comparison of the errors from the Average and Indi-
vidual Ex Ante Experts shows that the Average predic-
tions are considerably more accurate than the Individ-
ual predictions: The Average Ex Ante Expert prediction 
has an error of 14.92 compared to Individual Ex Ante 
Experts of 20.75. 
Table 2 also shows that the errors of the models’ 
predictions are generally somewhat higher than the er-
rors of the Average Ex Ante Experts’ predictions, but 
not necessarily higher than the Individual Ex Ante Ex-
perts’ predictions. The Inclusive Exchange Model 
makes the least accurate predictions. However, the av-
erage errors of the Restrictive Exchange Model are 
slightly lower than those of the Predictioneer’s Game. 
Another perspective on accuracy of predictions can 
be gained by focusing on the degree of accuracy, i.e., 
by grouping the magnitude of errors into absolute er-
rors that are 10 points or less, more than 10 and up to 
20 points, more than 20 and up to 30 points, and more 
than 30 points (see Table 3). Focusing on rather accu-
rate predictions with an average error of up to ten 
points, the Average Ex Ante Experts perform best (six 
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Table 2. Mean errors of each of the predictions (13 issues). 
 Our Coding of COP-21 Texts 
Average of Ex Ante Experts 14.92 
(12.77) 
Individual Ex Ante Experts 20.75 
(10.79) 
Inclusive Exchange Model 24.38 
(13.87) 
Restrictive Exchange Model 18.62 
(11.86) 
Predictioneer’s Game 19.54 
(10.71) 
Note: Standard deviations in brackets. 
Table 3. Distribution of errors by magnitude. 
 Our Coding of COP-21 Texts 
Average Ex Ante Experts 6 
3 
3 
1 
Individual Ex Ante Experts 1 
6 
5 
1 
Inclusive Exchange Model 0 
7 
3 
3 
Restrictive Exchange Model 2 
6 
4 
1 
Predictioneer’s Game 4 
4 
3 
2 
Note: The four entries per cell reflect the distribution of absolute errors: ≤ 10, > 10–20, > 20–30, > 30. 
Table 4. Pairwise comparison of predictive accuracy. 
  Individual Ex 
Ante Experts 
Inclusive 
Exchange Model 
Restricted 
Exchange model 
Predictioneer’s 
Game 
Average Ex Ante Experts Better 13 10 8 9 
Worse  3 5 4 
Same    0 
p .00 .09 .58 .27 
Individual Ex Ante Experts Better  7 6 8 
Worse  6  7 5 
Same     
p  .99 .99 .58 
Inclusive Exchange Model Better   2 3 
Worse   9 10 
Same   2  
p   .07 .09 
Restricted Exchange model Better    6 
Worse    6 
Same    1 
p    .99 
Note: Figures refer to the numbers of issues on which the row prediction is better, worse, or the same as the column 
prediction in terms of predictive accuracy. P-values are from the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Cox sign test; two-sided 
tests that the medians of the errors are equal. 
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issues), followed by the Predictioneer’s Game (four is-
sues), the Restrictive Exchange Model (two issues), 
and Individual Ex Ante Experts (one issue) - while the 
Inclusive Exchange Model performed worst (zero is-
sues). If we instead focus on major mispredictions ex-
ceeding 30 points, the Inclusive Exchange Model 
shows the most pronounced weakness (3 issues), fol-
lowed by the Predictioneer’s Game (two issues), while 
all other approaches only generate one major mis-
prediction each. 
In addition, Table 4 presents pairwise comparisons 
of the accuracy of each of the predictions with a simple 
non-parametric test (the sign test). A non-parametric 
test is arguably appropriate given both the small num-
bers of observations and the fact that the issues are in-
terdependent. The sign test allows us to test the hy-
pothesis that the difference between the median of 
the two sets of prediction errors is zero. A small p-
value (by convention when p≤.05) allows us to reject 
the null hypothesis, thereby inferring that one set of 
predicted errors is significantly lower than the other. 
The first inference to draw from Table 4 is that the 
predictions of the Average Ex Ante Experts are “better” 
(i.e., more accurate) than the Individual Ex Ante Ex-
perts on all 13 issues. This difference is highly signifi-
cant (p =.00). Moreover, there are no significant differ-
ences between the accuracy of the Individual ex ante 
predictions and those of the three sets of predictions 
from the negotiation simulation models. 
The predictions of the Inclusive Exchange Model are 
worse than those of the Restrictive Exchange Model, 
but this finding is not statistically significant at conven-
tional levels. Thus, there is limited evidence in favor of 
exchanges within substantively related subsets of is-
sues. The remaining pairwise comparison between the 
Inclusive Exchange Model and the Predictioneer’s 
Game is insignificant. Finally, there is no substantive or 
statistically significant evidence of differences in the 
performance of the Restricted Exchange Model and the 
Predictioneer’s Game. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
We conclude with several noteworthy observations 
from our investigation. Although the Paris agreement 
has been widely lauded as a great success for the glob-
al governance of climate change, the evidence suggests 
that the contents of the agreement reached is highly 
ambiguous. For each of the 13 main controversial is-
sues that formed the agenda in Paris, we went to con-
siderable lengths to describe in detail the possible dif-
ferent outcomes that might be reached to resolve the 
differences among the stakeholders’ positions. In early 
2016, we held an online survey of a small group of 
highly expert observers to assess what had been 
agreed in Paris a few months earlier, and found sub-
stantial differences among their answers in eight of the 
13 issues (their answers ranged more than 20 points on 
the 100-points issue scales). This may partly reflect the 
limitations of an email survey. But it also points to the 
inherent ambiguity in the Paris texts that were agreed. 
One member of a large negotiating team stated that 
much of the subsequent conference held in Bonn in 
May 2016 focused on figuring out exactly what had 
been decided the previous year (personal interview, 28 
June 2016). Introducing ambiguity in negotiation out-
comes is one way of achieving the semblance of agree-
ment and progress, which allows a broad range of partic-
ipants to claim victory. However, in this policy area 
where countries need to make specific commitments to 
mitigate, adapt to or compensate for the effects of cli-
mate change, ambiguity is highly problematic. We de-
cided to offer our substantiated assessment of the 
agreement reached at Paris (Appendix 2). Future ef-
forts to conduct a large-scale survey on interpreting 
the outcomes agreed at Paris in late 2015 might be in-
structive. 
The main finding from comparing the predictions 
with the actual outcomes is that the Average (collective) 
predictions of the Ex Ante Experts are significantly more 
accurate than the predictions of Individual experts. In 
other words, prior to the COP, individual experts tended 
to either under- or overestimate the ambitiousness of 
the outcomes that would be reached in Paris. However, 
on average their over-pessimistic and over-optimistic 
expectations cancelled each other out in the average 
predictions. This finding resonates with de Caricat’s clas-
sic jury theorem (de Caricat, 1785/1994); loosely stat-
ed, the theorem proves that as the size of a jury in-
creases from one to infinity, the likelihood that it will 
reach a correct verdict by collective majority vote ap-
proaches one. Similarly, public opinion researchers 
have found that public opinion at large appears to be 
better informed than individual voters, because errors 
of judgement made by individual voters cancel each 
other out in the process of aggregation (e.g., Page & 
Shapiro, 1992). The average predictions of the Ex Ante 
Experts also performed well in comparison to the pre-
dictions of the negotiation simulation models, but not 
significantly better. While experts’ predictions are a 
relevant benchmark for comparison, they offer no the-
oretical insights into the processes through which ne-
gotiations took place.  
By contrast, the Exchange Model and Predictio-
neer’s Game give detailed accounts of the negotiation 
process based on cooperative and possibly coercive 
negotiation processes, and our model comparisons 
provide some insight into the negotiations that took 
place in Paris. We found evidence that the Inclusive Ex-
change Model (which posits that all issues can be com-
bined with each other in profitable exchanges) per-
formed somewhat worse than the Restrictive Exchange 
Model (which posits that exchanges take place only 
within substantively related subsets of issues). This 
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points into the direction that logrolling takes place, and 
it is limited to subsets of substantively related issues. 
This challenges the idea that the COPs are forums in 
which “thinking is joined up” (Schroeder & Lovell, 
2012, p. 26), by suggesting that there are constraints to 
making such linkages. One of these constraints may lie 
in the structure of the negotiating teams, which given 
the complexity of the negotiations typically involve 
subgroups of officials working on different topics. 
These officials are often located in different ministries 
at the national level, such as foreign affairs, environ-
ment, and finance departments. Future research might 
examine the effects of such institutional constraints on 
both the ways in which delegations formulate their ne-
gotiating positions and the process of negotiations at 
the global level. 
The limitations of the present study highlight op-
portunities for future research. The evidence did not 
enable us to make statistically significant distinctions 
between the accuracy of most of the predictions we 
assessed. It is noteworthy that the evidence from the 
negotiated outcomes is consistent with predictions 
from two quite different negotiation models: the Re-
strictive Exchange Model and the Predictioneer’s 
Game. The former model offers a cooperative account 
based on limited logrolling across issues, while the lat-
ter offers a non-cooperative account in which issues 
are dealt with separately and actors may attempt to 
coerce others. Developing research designs to test the 
micro-level predictions of these models is still largely 
open ground for future research. Unlike the Ex Ante 
Experts, these models make not only predictions of the 
decision outcomes, but also of actors’ behavior and per-
ceptions during the negotiation process, including pre-
dictions of changes in the negotiating positions of each 
actor over time. Given the largely closed negotiations at 
Paris, systematic outside observation of relevant pro-
cesses was not practically feasible, yet we hope that fu-
ture research will overcome such limitations. 
Future research should also consider more refined 
designs that depart from our simplifying assumption 
that countries and groups of countries are unitary ac-
tors. This simplification was arguably justified by the 
fact that these actors take partially coherent positions 
in the UNFCCC negotiations. However, some authors 
would have preferred a more disaggregated approach 
that tried to identify factions within countries as the 
relevant actors. Further, we focused squarely on gov-
ernmental actors, agreeing with participants who ob-
served that COPs are primarily intergovernmental af-
fairs. However, the lobbying efforts of environmental 
and business interests are undoubtedly also worth to 
be explicitly included in the analyses. We recommend 
that future research in this area is explicitly compara-
tive in design, which means that it makes compari-
sons involving different theoretical approaches, dif-
ferent COPs, and possibly also negotiations in other 
settings. A degree of quantification strengthens our 
ability to make such comparisons. This represents a 
radical departure from common research practice in 
this field, which as noted in a recent review by Geno-
vese (2014) is dominated by qualitative case studies 
with some notable exceptions. The strength of quali-
tative case studies lies in the richness of the substan-
tive knowledge they convey. By combining this 
strength with the comparative method and a degree 
of quantification, we will be able to generate cumula-
tive knowledge about the conditions under which dis-
tinct negotiation processes are triggered and under 
which progress in international negotiations is 
achieved.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Issue and issue scales. 
1. Differentiation 
What will be the main principle(s) for differentiating efforts? 
0: No explicit differentiation (self-differentiation) 
25: National circumstances 
50: CBDR—Respective Capabilities in light of national circumstances 
75: CBDR—Respective Capabilities (with no direct reference to the Convention’s Annexes or Articles referring to those 
Annexes) 
100: Annexes I and II of the Convention 
 
2. Mitigation MRV and compliance 
Regarding mitigation, what will be the minimum MRV and compliance provisions any country faces? 
0: International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) 
45: ICA plus multilateral consultative process 
65: International Assessment and Review (IAR) 
75: IAR plus committee on implementation and/or compliance 
100: Kyoto compliance regime 
 
3. Mitigation legal form 
To what extent will the agreement and its components relating to mitigation targets be internationally legally binding? 
0: No binding agreement or binding country-specific targets 
30: Binding agreement without country-specific targets 
50: Binding agreement plus obligation to have a (nonbinding) country-specific target (NDC) 
70: The above plus obligation to do measuring, reporting and verification 
100: Binding agreement plus binding, country-specific targets and obligation to do measuring, reporting and verification 
 
4. Adaptation legal framework 
Regarding adaptation, to what extent will targets be country-specific and internationally legally 
binding? 
0: No new commitments on adaptation 
40: Collective, non-binding provisions (e.g., “all parties are encouraged to integrate adaptation into their national 
plans”) 
80: Non-binding country-specific commitments 
100: Legally binding country-specific commitments 
 
5. Adaptation institutions 
To what extent will the institutional framework for adaptation be strengthened? 
0: No strengthening 
60: Strengthen present institutions (e.g., stronger mandate, funding, and knowledge platform) 
80: Establish new institutions stronger than present ones 
100: Establish subsidiary body on adaptation 
 
6. Climate Finance (Volume) 
What will the size of agreed finance volume to be mobilized (private and public) by 2020 (per 
annum)? 
0: No new target (i.e., $100b p.a.) 
20: Unspecified increase above $100 billion 
40: $ 200 billion 
60: $ 300 billion 
80: $ 400 billion 
100: ≥ $500 billion or more 
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7.Climate Finance (Who Pays?) 
Who will be requested to pay for climate finance? 
0: Only developed countries required to contribute 
20: Developed countries required to contribute, and other countries invited to contribute voluntarily 
60: Developed countries and certain other countries required to contribute (e.g. “countries in a position to do so” or 
emerging economies) 
80: All countries minus LDCs and SIDS required to contribute 
100: All countries required to contribute 
 
8. Adaptation reserved financing 
Will there be new guidance on earmarking funds for adaptation? 
0: No new guidance 
50: Approximately 50% earmarked for adaptation 
100: Dedicated levy for adaptation 
 
9. Loss and Damage 
To which degree will loss & damage (L&D) be included in the agreement? 
0: No mention of L&D 
10: Preambular reference only 
20: Reference to Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) (in the main text) 
30: Separate chapter on L&D with little substance 
40: Separate chapter on L&D and new institutional arrangements with little substance 
50: Separate chapter on L&D and new institutional arrangements with new non-financial elements (such as coordina-
tion and capacity-building) 
70: Separate chapter on L&D and new mechanism with new non-financial and financial elements (such as insurance) 
but no compensation regime 
100: Separate chapter on L&D and new non-financial and financial elements, including a compensation regime 
 
10. Ambition level – mitigation mechanism 
Will there be a mechanism for strengthening commitments over time? 
0: No ambition mechanism 
30: “No backsliding” principle 
40: Non-binding progression principle 
65: Binding progression principle 
100: Binding commitment to strengthen targets in line with the 2 degrees goal 
 
11. Ambition 2050 
What (if any) goal will be set for reducing emissions by 2050? 
0: No 2050 goal 
20: Qualitative goal 
30: Qualitative goal with a roadmap 
40: 40% reduction relative to 2010 (or a roughly equivalent reduction relative to another base year) 
50: 50% 
60: 60% 
70: 70% 
80: 80% 
90: 90% 
100: Goal of zero net emissions 
 
12. Ambition 2100 
What (if any) goal will be set for reducing emissions by 2100? 
0: No 2100 goal 
20: Qualitative goal 
30: Qualitative goal with a roadmap 
80: Goal of zero net emissions 
100: Goal of negative net emissions 
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13. Ex-ante assessment (EAA) of future (I)NDCs 
Will the agreement include provisions for ex-ante assessment (EEA) of INDCs in future contribution periods? 
0: No EAA 
20: EAA of aggregate ambition 
60: EAA of aggregate ambition and technical EAA of individual INDCs (for transparency, clarity, comparability, etc.) 
90: EAA of aggregate ambition and technical EAA of individual INDCs plus a political assessment of individual INDCs (for 
ambition and equity/fairness) 
100: Alternative 4 and a formal mechanism for involving inputs from civil society 
 
Note: We reprint the text as submitted to ex ante experts in September 2015 for the coding of the expected outcomes 
of UNFCCC COP-21 at Paris, France (Kallbekken & Sælen, 2015). Our Coding of the Main COP-21 Decision & Paris 
Agreement (Appendix 2) in early 2016 uses a backward looking perspective on identical scales. 
Appendix 2. Our coding of the main COP-21 decision & Paris Agreement. 
Issue Our Coding of COP-21 De-
cision & Paris Agreement 
Textual Basis for Assessment 
Differentiation 50 Preamble; Art. 2.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.19 
Mitigation—MRV & Compliance 70 Art. 13 (in particular 13.4, 13.11, 13.12); Art. 15 
Mitigation—Legal Form 70 Art. 4.2 (NDC); Art 13 (reporting and MRV) 
Adaptation—Legal Framework 50 Art. 7.9 
Adaptation—Institutions 50 Art. 7.7 (in particular b) 
Climate Finance—Volume 20 Decision 115 
Climate Finance—Who Pays? 20 Art. 9.1, 9.2 
Adaptation Reserved Finance 40 Art. 9.4 
Loss & Damage 30 Art. 8 
Ambition Level—Mitigation Mecha-
nism 
65 Art. 4.3 
Mitigation—2050 10 Art. 4.1 
Mitigation—2100 80 Art. 4.1 
Ex Ante Assessment of Future (I)NDCs 20 Decision 20, Art. 14 
Source: FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf). See Appendix 1 for 
scaling. 
